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Abstract
Modifications to a previous proof of the security of EPR-based quan-
tum key distribution are proposed. This modified version applies to a
protocol using three conjugate measurement bases rather than two. A
higher tolerable error rate is obtained for the three-basis protocol.
1 Introduction
A modified version of a proof of the security [1] of EPR-based quantum key
distribution is proposed. Based on the works [2, 3], this modified version applies
to a protocol using three conjugate measurement bases rather than two. Only
modified parts of the proof are presented here. The framework of our study and
the remaining parts of the proof can be found in [1].
2 The protocol
We describe the quantum key distribution protocol under consideration. It is
a variation of the protocol described in [1] using three conjugate measurement
bases rather than two. In this variation, the source is supposed to emit pairs
of photons with orthogonal polarisations. As a consequence, Alice’s bits and
Bob’s bits are anticorrelated when no error occurs.
Protocol setup
Alice and Bob specify:
• m, the length (in bits) of the private key to be generated.
• ǫ, the maximum threshold value for the error rate during the quantum
transmission (ǫ < 1/4).
• τ , a security constant such that ǫ1−ǫ < ǫ1−ǫ + τ < 1.
• the security parameter r. It must be large enough so that Alice and
Bob can find a binary matrix K of size m × r such that any linear
combination of rows of K that contains at least one row of K has
weight greater than dK =
(
ǫ
1−ǫ + τ
)
r. Alice and Bob choose one
1
such matrix K. Shannon’s coding theorem tells that for asymptotic
values of m, such matrix can be found if r obeys the inequality:
m
r
≤ 1− h
(
1
2
ǫ
1− ǫ +
τ
2
)
.
• An error reconciliation scheme for strings of length s =
⌊
r
1−ǫ
⌋
bits
as specified in [1].
• n, the number of pairs of photons to be sent to the legitimate parties.
A good choice for n is
⌈
r
1−ǫ
3 −τS
⌉
where τS is a small but strictly
positive constant.
Quantum transmission
• A source sends a sequence of n photons to Alice and another sequence
of n photons to Bob. It is assumed that ideally, for each i ∈ {1 . . . n},
the source emits a pair of photons in the state:
|Ψ−〉 = | 0〉0| 1〉0 − | 1〉0| 0〉0√
2
and that Alice’s i-th photon is the first photon of this pair, and
Bob’s i-th photon is the second photon of this pair. The kets | 0〉0
and | 1〉0 form an orthonormal basis “0” of the Hilbert space de-
scribing the polarisation of one photon. The kets | 0〉1 = | 0〉0−| 1〉0√2
and | 1〉1 = | 0〉0+| 1〉0√2 form its first conjugate basis “1”. The sec-
ond conjugate basis “2” is formed by the kets | 0〉2 = | 0〉0+i| 1〉0√2 and
| 1〉2 = i | 0〉0−i| 1〉0√2 .
As in [1], the source needs not to be trusted and can be under Eve’s
control. The only assumption is that Alice and Bob receive a se-
quence of n single photon signals on each side.
• We assume that the measurement devices of Alice and Bob have
efficiency one. For each i ∈ {1 . . . n},
1. Alice picks randomly a basis ai ∈ {0, 1, 2} with uniform proba-
bility distribution. Alice measures her i-th photon in the basis
ai, obtaining the outcome αi ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to the state
|αi〉ai .
2. Similarly, Bob picks randomly and independently of Alice a ba-
sis bi ∈ {0, 1, 2} with uniform probability distribution. Bob
measures his i-th photon in the basis bi, obtaining the outcome
βi ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to the state |βi〉bi .
Sifting
Alice and Bob compare publicly their bases ~a and ~b. We denote by ~d the
vector in {0, 1, 2}n defined by di = bi − ai (mod 3) for all i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
If the number of indexes i ∈ {1 . . . n} such that ai = bi is greater than
or equal to s then the sifted set S is the set of the first s such indexes.
Otherwise the validation test is failed. The bit strings αS and ¬βS are the
sifted keys, where for any vector ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote by ¬~x the vector
whose i-th entry is 1 + xi (mod 2) for all i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
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Error correction
Alice and Bob perform the error correction on their sifted keys αS and ¬βS
as specified in the protocol setup. The error set E is the set of indexes
i in S in which an error is found, that is, αi = βi. The error vector ~e is
the vector in {0, 1}s giving the positions of the errors (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s},
ei = 1 if and only if αi = βi). We denote by e the size of the set E. The
validation test is passed if e < ǫs, otherwise it is failed. If the validation
test is passed, then the reconciled set R is the set of the first r indexes
i ∈ S \E. Therefore |R| = r and ∀i ∈ R, ai = bi and αi = ¬βi. Alice and
Bob obtain with high probability an identical string of bits αR ∈ {0, 1}r,
called the reconciled key.
Privacy amplification
The private key is defined as:
1. ~κ = KαR (mod 2) if the validation test is passed.
2. an m-bit string ~κ picked randomly by Alice with uniform probability
distribution each time the validation test is failed.
3 Privacy of the protocol
The privacy of the three-basis protocol is stated and the achievable key-creation
rate discussed.
Property 1 The protocol described above offers perfect privacy: for any eaves-
dropping strategy chosen by a possible eavesdropper, the conditional entropy of
the private key ~κ given the eavesdropper’s view v is bounded from below by:
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
,
where
θ(r) = e−
1
16 τ
3r.
The above bound applies for any value of the security parameter r such that
the matrix K specified in the protocol exists.
Therefore, for asymptotic values of the security parameter r, a net gain in
shared private bits can be obtained if:
1− h
(
1
2
ǫ
1− ǫ
)
− 1
1− ǫh(ǫ) > 0.
since sh(ǫ) bits are required for the one-time pad encryption during the error
reconciliation, as in [1].
In comparison, we proved that for the original protocol using two measure-
ment bases only, a net gain in shared private bits can be obtained if:
1− h
(
ǫ
1− ǫ
)
− 1
1− ǫh(ǫ) > 0.
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Therefore, the three-basis protocol seems to be more robust than the original
protocol. However, one must realise that a given threshold value on the error
rate gives different physical constraints on the quantum channel depending on
whether two-basis or three-basis protocol is used. Whether the two-basis or
the three-basis protocol is more robust and efficient depends on the technology
chosen to implement the transmission and the reception of the quantum signals.
4 Proof of the privacy
The proof of the above result is given. It is mainly identical to the proof proposed
in [1] for the original protocol. Therefore, only parts that are different from this
previous proof are detailed. The main difference between the previous proof
and this proof resides in Section 4.3.
4.1 Notations
We define the notations used throughout the proof. They are similar to the ones
used in [1], but the indexes for Bell states have been modified. The notations
have been adapted to deal with three bases.
Classical data
We denote by C = (~a,~b, ~α, ~β) the classical data Alice and Bob generate
during the protocol (after the setup). We denote by P = (~a, ~d, ~e) the data
that are publicly announced by Alice and Bob during the protocol. For
any possible P , we denote by CP the set of values for the classical data
that are compatible with the public announcement of P . That is, for a
given P = (~a, ~d, ~e),
CP = {C′ = (~a′,~b′, ~α′, ~β′) : ~a′ = ~a,
∀i, b′i = ai + di (mod 3)
∀i ∈ E, α′i = β′i and ∀i ∈ S \ E, α′i = ¬β′i
where S and E are given by ~d and ~e.}.
Given a possible P and a value for the private key ~κ, we define CP,~κ as
the set of values for the classical data that are compatible with the public
announcement of P and generation of ~κ for the private key. That is, for a
given P = (~a, ~d, ~e),
CP,~κ = {C′ = (~a′,~b′, ~α′, ~β′) : ~a′ = ~a,
∀i, b′i = ai + di (mod 3)
∀i ∈ E, α′i = β′i and ∀i ∈ S \ E, α′i = ¬β′i
Kα′
R
= ~κ (mod 2),
where S, E and R are given by ~d and ~e.}.
Finally, we denote by P the set of all possible public announcements for
which the validation test is passed. That is,
P = {P = (~a, ~d, ~e) : w0(~d) ≥ s and e < ǫs}.
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We denote by T the subset S \ (E ∪R), and by t the size of T .
Bell states
For each i ∈ {1 . . . n}, we define the Bell basis {| 0〉i, | 1〉i, | 2〉i, | 3〉i} of
the i-th pair of photons as:
| 0〉i = | 0〉0,i| 1〉0,i − | 1〉0,i| 0〉0,i√
2
,
| 1〉i = | 0〉0,i| 1〉0,i + | 1〉0,i| 0〉0,i√
2
,
| 2〉i = | 0〉0,i| 0〉0,i − | 1〉0,i| 1〉0,i√
2
,
| 3〉i = | 0〉0,i| 0〉0,i + | 1〉0,i| 1〉0,i√
2
,
where the first and the second state in the product states in the rhs. cor-
respond to Alice’s and Bob’s i-th photon’s polarisation state, respectively.
Given a basis a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we define Xa as the set of indexes of Bell states
that are compatible with Alice and Bob measuring in the same basis a and
obtaining opposite bit values (corresponding to a faithful transmission, as
the source is supposed to emit an antisymmetric state). Likewise, we define
Ya as the set of indexes of Bell states that are compatible with Alice and
Bob measuring in basis a and sharing the same bit value (corresponding
to an error). That is, X0 = {0, 1}, X1 = {0, 2}, X2 = {0, 3}, Y0 = {2, 3},
Y1 = {1, 3} and Y2 = {1, 2}. Given the choice of bases ~a and a set
A ⊂ {1 . . . n}, we define XaA as {cA ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}A : ∀i ∈ A, ci ∈ Xai}
and YaA as {cA ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}A : ∀i ∈ A, ci ∈ Yai}. Given a reconciled set
R and the choice of bases aR on R, for any cR ∈ XaR , we will denote by
~γ the unique ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, ci = (1+ ai)γi.
For any vectors ~x, ~y ∈ {0, 1}r, we define ~x ·~y as ~x ·~y Def= ∑ri=1 xiyi. Given
R and aR, for any cR ∈ XaR , we have the identity aR〈αR,¬αR |cR〉 =
(−1)αR·(¬~γ)(−i)~πaR ·~γ√
2
r , where ~πaR is a vector in {0, 1}r with its i-th entry
equal to 1 if and only if ai = 2.
4.2 Model of measurements
The mathematical model of measurements on the quantum state generated by
the source is almost identical to the one described in [1].
The state of the n couples of photons and the probe created by Eve reads
as:
ρ =
∑
~c,~c′
|E~c〉〈E~c′ | ⊗ |~c〉〈~c′ |,
where the states |E~c〉 are states of Eve’s probe that are possibly nor orthogonal
nor normalised. The positive operator giving the probability that Alice and Bob
get C = (~a,~b, ~α, ~β) as their classical data is:
FC = P~a(~a)P~b(
~b)| ~α, ~β〉~a,~b ~a,~b〈~α, ~β |,
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where P~a(~a) = 1/3
n and P~b(
~b) = 1/3n for any choice of ~a and ~b. Note that since
for all i ∈ {1 . . . n}, di = bi − ai (mod 3), we have P~a(~a)P~b(~b) = P~a(~a)P~d(~d)
where P~d(
~d) = 1/3n.
The positive operator giving the probability that Alice and Bob publicly
announce P = (~a, ~d, ~e) while they get the private key ~κ is:
FP,~κ = P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)1S ⊗
∑
αE∈{0,1}e
|αE , αE〉aE ,aE aE ,aE 〈αE, αE |
⊗
∑
αT∈{0,1}t
|αT ,¬αT 〉aT ,aT aT ,aT 〈αT ,¬αT |
⊗
∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ (mod 2)
|αR,¬αR〉aR,aR aR,aR〈αR,¬αR |,
and the positive operator giving the marginal probability that Alice and Bob
publicly announce P = (~a, ~d, ~e) is:
FP = P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)1S ⊗
∑
αE∈{0,1}e
|αE, αE〉aE ,aE aE ,aE 〈αE , αE |
⊗
∑
αT∈{0,1}t
|αT ,¬αT 〉aT ,aT aT ,aT 〈αT ,¬αT |
⊗
∑
αR∈{0,1}r
|αR,¬αR〉aR,aR aR,aR〈αR,¬αR |.
Note again that when no error occurs, Alice’s bit and Bob’s bit are anticor-
related.
We denote by VP the set of views v that are compatible with the pub-
lic announcement P . The positive operator giving the probability that Eve
gets the view v given that Alice and Bob announced P will be denoted by
Gv|P = |χv|P 〉〈χv|P |, where we assume again without loss of generality that
the operators Gv|P are of rank one.
4.3 The roˆle of the validation test
Here a variation of the Property 2 in [1] is given. It is shown that when three
bases are used for the validation test, the constraint on the photon state created
by Eve is more stringent. Given a possible reconciled set R, let ΠR be the
orthogonal projection operator defined as:
ΠR =
∑
~c∈{0,1,2,3}n :
w(cR)≥dK/2
|~c〉〈~c |
= 1R ⊗
∑
cR∈{0,1,2,3}r :
w(cR)≥dK/2
| cR〉〈cR |.
The following property is then proved.
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Property 2 The eigenvalues of the semi-definite positive Hermitian operator∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠR,
where R is specified by P in the sum, are bounded from above by
θ(r) = e−
1
16 τ
3r.
Proof The above operator can be written as:
∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠR =
∑
~d∈{0,1}n :
w0(~d)≥s
∑
~e∈{0,1}s :
w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR.
Now for given ~d and ~e,∑
~a
FP = P~d(
~d)1S ⊗i∈E Yi ⊗j∈T Xj ⊗k∈R Xk,
where
Xi = | 0〉〈0 |+ 1
3
| 1〉〈1 |+ 1
3
| 2〉〈2 |+ 1
3
| 3〉〈3 |,
Yi =
2
3
| 1〉〈1 |+ 2
3
| 2〉〈2 |+ 2
3
| 3〉〈3 |
are operators acting on i-th photon pair’s Hilbert space. The last equalities are
derived directly from the definition of the Bell states. As a consequence, we
have,
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR = P~d(
~d)1S ⊗i∈E Yi ⊗j∈T Xj ⊗
( ∑
cR∈{0,1,2,3} :
w(cR)≥dK/2
| cR〉〈cR |
3w(cR)
)
.
Now, given ~d ∈ {0, 1}n, the operator:
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR
is diagonal in the Bell basis |~c〉. Given a vector ~c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n and an error
vector ~e ∈ {0, 1}s, a necessary condition for the scalar:
〈~c |ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR|~c〉
to be non zero is that for all i ∈ S, ei = 0 if ci = 0 and w(cS) ≥ dK2 + e. There
are
(
w(cS)
e
)
such vectors ~e of weight e, if 0 ≤ e < ǫs and e ≤ w(cS) − dK/2.
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Therefore,
〈~c |
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR|~c〉
≤ P~d(~d)
∑
0≤e<ǫs
e≤w(cS)−dK/2
(
w(cS)
e
)(
2
3
)e(
1
3
)w(cS)−e
.
Now, dK is either greater or smaller than
2
3w(cS) (1 + τ(1− ǫ)).
• If dK > 23w(cS) (1 + τ(1 − ǫ)), then
w(cS)− dK
2
<
2
3
w(cS)
(
1− 1
2
τ(1 − ǫ)
)
and,
• if dK ≤ 23w(cS) (1 + τ(1 − ǫ)), then
ǫs ≤ ǫr
1− ǫ
= dK − τr
≤ 2
3
w(cS)
(
1− 1
2
τ(1 − ǫ)
)
,
where we have used r ≥ s(1− ǫ) and s ≥ w(cS).
We thus derived that:
〈~c |
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR|~c〉
≤ P~d(~d)
∑
0≤e< 23w(cS)(1− 12 τ(1−ǫ))
(
w(cS)
e
)(
2
3
)e (
1
3
)w(cS)−e
≤ P~d(~d)e−
2
9 τ
2(1−ǫ)2w(cS)
≤ P~d(~d)e−
1
16 τ
3r
= P~d(
~d)θ(r)
where we have used the binomial inequality stating that
∑
0≤k<(p−t)n
(
n
k
)
pk(1−
p)n−k ≤ e−2t2n for any positive integer n and 0 < p − t ≤ p < 1. In the last
inequality we have used the inequalities ǫ < 1/4 and w(cS) ≥ dK/2 when the
above scalar is non zero.
Remarking that the operator
∑
~a,~e : e<ǫsΠRFPΠR is diagonal in the Bell
basis for all ~d and
∑
~d :w0(~d)≥s P~d(
~d) ≤ 1, this concludes the proof. ✷
The above property implies that:
Tr
(
1Eve ⊗
∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠRρ
)
≤ θ(r)
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where 1Eve is the identity operator acting on the Hilbert space of the probe.
That is, ∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
cR∈XaR :
w(cR)≥dK/2
〈E~c |E~c〉 ≤ θ(r).
4.4 Quasi-independence of the key and the view
In this section we compute the joint probability distribution of the key and the
view. We prove that this distribution is very close to a product of an uniform
distribution for the key and the marginal probability distribution of the view.
This section is identical to the Section 5.4 of the previous proof, except for the
apparition of few phase factors that do not appear in the final result.
Property 3 For any given eavesdropping strategy chosen by Eve and returning
a view v, the probability distribution of the key ~κ and the view v obeys the
following inequality:∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(θ(r) + 2√θ(r))
where m is the length of the private key and r is the size of the reconciled set.
Proof For any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, P and v ∈ VP , we have:
P~κv(~κ, v)−
1
2m
Pv(v)
= Tr(Gv|P ⊗ FP,~κ ρ)−
1
2m
Tr(Gv|P ⊗ FP ρ)
= P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
~c,~c′ :
cE,c
′
E∈YaE ,
cT ,c
′
T∈XaT ,
cR,c
′
R∈XaR
〈E~c′ |Gv|P |E~c〉δcR,c′Rd~κ,aR(~γ,~γ
′),
where
d~κ,aR(~γ,~γ
′) = (−i)~πaR ·~γ(+i)~πaR ·~γ′
∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ (mod 2)
(−1)αR·(~γ+~γ′)
2r
− 1
2m
δ~γ,~γ′.
where we have used the identity aR,aR〈αR,¬αR |cR〉 = (−1)
αR·(¬~γ)(−i)~πaR ·~γ√
2
r for
any cR ∈ XaR (note that ¬~γ + ¬~γ′ = ~γ + ~γ′).
Let’s define G as the set of all linear combinations over {0, 1} of rows of K.
It has been proved in [1] that:∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ (mod 2)
(−1)αR·(~γ+~γ′) =
{
(−1)~θ~κ·(~γ+~γ′)2r−m if ~γ + ~γ′ ∈ G,
0 if ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G
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where ~θ~κ is a vector in {0, 1}r such that K~θ~κ = ~κ (mod 2). We have:
P~κv(~κ, v)− 1
2m
Pv(v) =
1
2m
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
(Uv~κcR + Vv~κcR)
†∆(Uv~κcR + Vv~κcR),
where Uv~κcR and Vv~κcR are complex vectors of dimension 2
r and ∆ is a 2r × 2r
complex matrix, whose entries are indexed by ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r. The ~γ-th entry of
Uv~κcR and Vv~κcR are:(
Uv~κcR
)
~γ
=
{
(−1)~θ~κ·~γ(−i)~πaR ·~γ〈χv|P |E~c〉 if w(~γ) < dK/2,
0 if w(~γ) ≥ dK/2.(
Vv~κcR
)
~γ
=
{
0 if w(~γ) < dK/2,
(−1)~θ~κ·~γ(−i)~πaR ·~γ〈χv|P |E~c〉 if w(~γ) ≥ dK/2,
where ~c is given by cR and ~γ. The (~γ,~γ
′)-th entry of ∆ is, as in [1]:(
∆
)
~γ,~γ′
=
{
1 if ~γ + ~γ′ ∈ G \ {0},
0 if ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G \ {0}.
This implies U †v~κcR∆Uv~κcR = 0, since w(~γ) < dK/2 and w(~γ
′) < dK/2
implies that w(~γ + ~γ′) < dK , that is, ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G \ {~0}. The matrix ∆ is
diagonalised in the same manner as in [1], and we obtain:
V †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR = 2
m
[
(2m − 1)
∑
~x∈S
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2 −
∑
~x∈S
~σ∈{0,1}m\~0
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ|2
]
,
U †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR = 2
m
[
(2m − 1)
∑
~x∈S
|φ∗v,cR,~x,~κψv,cR,~x,~κ| −
∑
~x∈S
~σ∈{0,1}m\~0
|φ∗v,cR,~x,~κ+~σψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ|
]
.
where S is a subspace of {0, 1}r supplement to G, and for any ~z ∈ {0, 1}m,
φv,cR,~x,~z =
∑
~y∈G :
w(~x+~y)<dK/2
(−i)~πaR ·~y (−1)
~ω~y·~z
2m
〈χv|P |E~c〉,
ψv,cR,~x,~z =
∑
~y∈G :
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
(−i)~πaR ·~y (−1)
~ω~y·~z
2m
〈χv|P |E~c〉.
where for any ~y ∈ G, ~ω~y is the unique vector in {0, 1}m such that KT ~ω~y = ~y
(mod 2).
From this one derives the inequality:∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(2m − 1)(η + 2√η√ξ),
10
where
η =
∑
P∈P
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2,
ξ =
∑
P∈P
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)|φv,cR,~x,~κ|2.
We then derive an upper-bound on η and ξ. We have:
η =
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~y,~y′∈G :
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
w(~x+~y′)≥dK/2
∑
~κ
(−1)~ω~y+~y′ ·~κ
22m
×(−i)~πaR ·~y(+i)~πaR ·~y′〈E~c′ |χv|P 〉〈χv|P |E~c〉
=
1
2m
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
~x∈S
∑
~y∈G :
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
∑
v∈VP
〈E~c |χv|P 〉〈χv|P |E~c〉
≤ 1
2m
θ(r),
using the result of the previous section. Similarly,
ξ ≤ 1
2m
.
Consequently,
∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
which concludes our proof. ✷
4.5 Bound on the conditional entropy
As in [1], we conclude the proof of privacy thanks to the following property.
Property 4 Let x and y be two discrete random variables taking values in the
sets X and Y respectively. Let µ be a nonnegative real number. If the following
inequality is satisfied:
∑
x∈X , y∈Y
∣∣∣∣Pxy(x, y) − 1|X |Py(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ,
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then the conditional entropy of x given y is lower-bounded by:
H(x|y) ≥ (1 − µ) log2 |X | −
1
ln 2
µ.
The proof of this property has been given in [1]. The probability distribution
of the private key and the view obeys the inequality:
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m,
v∈V
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(θ(r) + 2√θ(r)),
where we have used the fact that the key is randomly chosen by Alice with
uniform probability distribution if the validation test is not passed. Applying
the above property for the random variables ~κ and v, we obtain:
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
,
which concludes the proof of privacy. ✷
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